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Israel's contenders for the 2009 Eurovision Song Contest (known as the 
ESC or, as here, Eurovision) were the Israeli Jewish-Arab duo Achinoam 
Nini and Mira Awad. The chosen song was "There Must Be Another Way," a 
tri -lingual appeal for peace and reconciliation sung in Hebrew, Arabic, and 
English. The decision to nominate Nini and Awad as Israel's representatives 
to Eurovision was announced in early January, in the midst of a full-scale 
war Israel launched on Gaza and its inhabitants, which came in response 
to several years of rockets fired into Israel from the Hamas-led territory. 
Given the timing and the high profile of the ESC, an annual competition 
held among active member countries of the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU), the duo's collaboration generated much public debate in Israel and 
beyond. The debate highlighted the symbolic charge of the song and its 
performers, and it continued throughout the year, animated by the political 
situation, the duo's activities, and the media that closely followed the process 
leading to the May 2009 contest and its aftermath. This article will analyze 
the meanings given to the artistic collaboration of the two performers that 
were circulating in the public sphere to show how, in this war-torn region, 
cultural and political domains are intertwined such that wars are fought not 
only with guns and rockets but also within cultural spheres, and that both 
domains are constitutive of highly contested social constructions of ethnic 
and national affiliations. 
Eurovision is a site in which the intersection of popular culture with 
national and international politics is especially visible, due to its country-
centered format, the voting processes, and the extent of mass mediation-
over 100 million viewers each year (Haan, Dijkstra, and Dijkstra 2005). The 
voting process takes place at the national level first when the representative 
song is chosen, and later during the Eurovision Song Contest, when each 
country votes for other countries' representative songs. Since the late 1990s, 
the voting process at both stages typically combines popular votes counted 
in local telethons with votes cast by a panel of experts commonly associated 
with each country's broadcasting apparatus (Cleridos and Stengos 2006).1 
Songs must be newly written for the occasion, and the participatory nature 
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of the selection process serves to mobilize citizens to share in the creation 
of what Benedict Anderson calls the "physical realization of the imagined 
community" (1983:145). According to Anderson, the moments in which 
songs are publicly shared to signify an event-for example, anthems sung 
on national holidays-create an experience of simultaneity in which people 
who are unknown to each other come together in a special kind of imagined 
community: the nation. What Anderson is pointing to is that music provides 
one of the ways in which nationhood is culturally constructed. The partici-
patory nature of Eurovision provides for similar moments of simultaneity, 
both when the public votes for the song and image that would represent the 
nation, and when it votes for other nation's songs. 
At the same time that Eurovision is a participatory event, the 
Eurovision voting process also leaves much of the control in the hands of 
government-affiliated institutions. In other words, what represents "the 
nation;' and also determines the relative value of cultural production of 
other nations, combines both popular vote and government control. This 
process highlights the important role cultural policy has in the creation of 
the imagined community, and in the delimitation of the cultural boundaries 
of this community with respect to other communities. Miller and Ylidice 
(2002) analyze cultural policy as a conflation of two registers: the aesthetic 
register and the anthropological register, which, when combined, provide 
for the training of citizens to share common values. The songs represented 
at Eurovision provide the musical and lyrical content that is interpreted at 
the aesthetic register, while the context of national representation directed 
by government institutions inculculates nationalist sentiments among 
citizens in a manner deemed appropriate by such institutions. According 
to Jacques Attali (1985), music is both a channel for power and a form of 
entertainment. Eurovision is a prime example of this: its country-centered 
format and voting processes have turned it into an international contest 
in which centralized power structures such as government broadcasting 
institutions mobilize music as a "tool for the creation or consolidation of a 
community, of a totality" (Attali 1985:6). Music in this context links power 
centers to subjects on several levels. The highly mediated environment and 
the commercial nature of the hype preceding the contest render Eurovision a 
prominent economic institution. But as Philip Bohlman suggests, Eurovision 
also sparks attachments that extend well beyond its economic function and 
"the events leading up to the final broadcast make it almost impossible to 
escape the allure of a nation symbolized through its music" (2004:3). What 
links power centers to subjects here is a commercial musical event that serves 
both as a market and as a social institution that reinforces the guided image 
of "the nation." 
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Eurovision also provides an international forum in which nations can 
define their identity through the expression of local opinion about the 
cultural production of others, in an environment seemingly free of politi-
calor economic sanctioning; however, despite the autonomy given to the 
participating countries, the voting process tends to be influenced by cultural 
or historical alliances between nations (Clerides and Stengos 2006), which 
affects the voting public and jurists' aesthetic preferences. It is not only the 
country-centered voting process that provides an outlet for (inter) -national 
alignments. Sometimes the representative songs themselves can highlight 
a nation's positioning vis-a-vis other nations. Israeli-Yemenite singer Ofra 
Haza's international career was launched during the 1983 Eurovision when 
she was placed second with the song "Chai" (Alive), which became an inter-
national hit. That year Eurovision was hosted in Munich, Germany, where 
a decade earlier Israeli athletes were massacred at the Munich Olympiade. 
The song contains two lines that repeat: "Israel is alive" and "I am still alive." 
Bearing in mind that the newborn state of Israel became the immediate home 
of many holocaust survivors following World War II, the location and context 
in which the song was performed provided for a symbolic affirmation of 
the nation both in respect to the trajectory of Israel's founding, and to the 
perceived contemporary threats to its existence. 
The importance of Eurovision in the construction of nationhood 
within the international arena can also be deduced from the Palestinian 
Broadcasting Corporation's (PBC) 2007 application to the EBU for active 
membership and participation in the 2008 Eurovision, despite the fact that 
Palestine is not yet recognized as an independent nation -state. Cheun-Fung 
Wong quotes Fadia Daibes, the spokesperson for this campaign, who stated 
that PBe's purpose in aspiring to join Eurovision is to "change the perception 
of Palestinian identity and to present our rich culture ... to put Palestine 
back on the map by showing that we have many stories to tell" (2009:280). 
Beyond the political struggle for Palestinian emancipation, the PBC is 
looking for international recognition of Palestinian nationhood through 
its assertion of a Palestinian cultural essence. Both Ofra Haza's song and 
the PBe's spokesperson's statement show how a national imaginary-the 
meanings and significations derived from cultural practices and products 
that enable a community to imagine itself a nation (Marcus and Myers 
1995:10)-is forged through and with an eye and ear tuned to other na-
tions. Haza's song establishes the vitality of Israeli citizenship through its 
affirmative performance on German soil, while the PBC seeks international 
recognition for the distinct cultural identity of Palestinians as part of the 




But while the structure of the Eurovision process provides a means for 
participating countries to express and advance an imaginary that highlights 
national unity, Israel's 2009 ESC entry shows that in a fraught and highly 
charged domestic socio-political situation, it can also provide an opportunity 
for voices of dissent, and hence, contribute to the the fragmentation of the 
imagined monolithic nation. In its specific historical moment, against the 
backdrop of the war on Gaza, Israel's entry became a symbolic battleground 
for contested and conflicted national imaginaries and interests. In their 
representation of Israel at Eurovision, the artists were advancing the idea of 
a pluralistic Israel that should and can include its Arabic-speaking minorities 
as equally represented within the Jewish state. Israeli state authorities were 
promoting the pluralistic symbolism to counter Israel's negative image in 
the larger world at a time when Israel faced much international criticism. 
Supporters of the Palestinian struggle, both in Israel and the occupied 
Palestinian territories, interpreted the collaboration as undermining the 
Palestinian struggle for national emancipation, and used the collaboration 
to keep the plight of the Gazans and the struggle for Palestinian self-deter-
mination alive in the public mind, in Israel and abroad. The diverse positions 
and discourses surrounding Israel's 2009 Eurovision entry, analyzed below, 
show how this popular song contest became implicated in the politics of 
inter-ethnic warfare during an especially charged and violent period as a site 
of contesting social constructions of ethnic and national affiliations. 
On the Politics of Popular Cultural Production 
Steven Feld (1984) argues that the production and reception of music is an 
intersubjective process of reality construction. Through this process, music 
comes to generate contradictory meanings for historically situated actors, 
meanings that are revealed through discourse about music. If music is a site 
in which relationships between ethnicity and nation can be differentially 
configured and highlighted by the participating actors, it can also become a 
locus of struggles for legitimacy or dominance for different groups (Bohlman 
2004; Gilroy 1987,1993; Hall 1991; Lipsitz 1994; Regev and Seroussi 2004; 
Stokes 1992, 1994). As Martin Stokes suggests, what is constructed through 
music often involves notions of difference and social boundaries, as well as 
the organization of hierarchies of moral and political order. It therefore also 
provides a means for social actors to negotiate and transform the hierarchies 
of place, ethnicity, or nation inscribed by dominant ideologies. 
In the context ofIsrael and Palestine, notions of "the popular" in music 
can apply to local versions of pop and rock genres, as well as to music 
associated with Palestinian resistance movement that circulates through 
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alternative, non-mediated channels; classic Israeli repertoire that coalesced 
into a hegemonic genre known as "Songs of the Land of Israel" (Shirei 
Erets Israel) in the first decades following the founding of the state and that 
musically, often derived its structure and modality from Eastern-European 
folk music; and the repertoire of famous Egyptian artists such as Umm 
Kulthum and Muhammad Abdul-Wahab who had become household names 
all over the Middle East during the golden years of the Egyptian music and 
film industry, but are today considered "classical" Arab artists. In this article 
I limit the discussion of popular music to internationally predominant 
mass-mediated genres of the past several decades such as pop and rock 
and their local adaptations. The process of adapting mass-mediated global 
popular music genres to local conceptions and languages tends to combine 
both local and cosmopolitan idioms, thus expanding the base of cultural 
materials from which local representations can be constructed (Regev and 
Seroussi 2004), and hence, also expanding the basis of interpretive reception 
to such products. Furthermore, their mediated circulation also facilitates 
the constitution of groups that identify with such representations or op-
pose them: as Nini and Awad's collaboration became a site of struggles for 
legitimacy and contingent ideologies in both Palestinian and Israeli public 
spheres, the heightened media exposure facilitated the constitution of groups 
that either identified or disagreed with this representation. The role of this 
collaboration as constitutive of contradictory sentiments and affiliations 
was further complicated by the singers' "belonging" to multiple spheres of 
interest in a highly fraught situation. While the two singers believed that their 
collaboration was forwarding coexistence, the public debate that surrounded 
it highlighted that, for others, this collaboration sanctioned the oppression 
of Palestinians aspiring to becoming an independent nation. 
The lyrics of Israel's 2009 Eurovision song, "There Must Be Another 
Way," evoke hardship and pain, and in that sense, they diverge from the 
light topical fare often hosted by the ESC. Musically, however, "There 
Must Be Another Way" is rather typical of the pop balladry found in many 
Eurovision entries that often adhere to the dominant Anglo-American pop 
aesthetic and are devoid of the sonic indexing of ethnicity, place, or nation, 
that consolidate group identities and mobilize hegemonic struggles in many 
music genres.2 The song's arrangement is an up-tempo, danceable mix of 
drum machine, guitars, an electric keyboard, and miscellaneous "ethnic" 
percussion instruments such as the Middle Eastern def and Yemenite jerry-
can drums. This "ethnic" percussion provides for visual touches of exotica 
in performance and allows a seductive marketing strategy that positions 
the musical representation as "authentic" (Taylor 1997), even though these 




The political significance of Israel's 2009 entry is by and large located in 
the combined contexts of the singers' ethnically-mixed national representa-
tion during an armed conflict and high political tension in a hyper-mediated 
inter-national popular music event, rather than in sonic symbolism. And 
it is this representation, not the sonic imagery, that was the primary site 
of the discursive conflict during the 2009 Eurovision debates. The duo 
collaborated prior to this Eurovision song and encountered no criticism. It 
is the particular contexts of production and reception in which this song 
came to life in order to represent Israel at a time when it was waging war on 
Palestinians that greatly amplified interpretive tensions in social construc-
tions of meaning regarding what kind of place and nation the collaboration 
was about: a democratic, multicultural Israel, or an Israel that provided a 
token representation to its minority only to leverage the violent oppression 
of the Palestinian people. These tensions manifested in the highly confron-
tational nature of the discourse, in which divergent meanings associated 
with the multi-lingual and bi-ethnic representation ofIsrael at the ESC were 
constructed as contested struggles for survival. The volatility of the debate 
surrounding the song shows how this interplay between popular expressive 
culture and politics also diffused the boundaries of what is often conceived 
of as independent to each of these domains (Massad 2005). 
The Song's Producers: A Vision of a Pluralistic, Multicultural Israel 
While Israel had been participating at the ESC since 1973, this was the 
first occasion on which Israel included not only the embodied presence of 
its non-Jewish minority, but also her language, an Arab citizen singing in 
Arabic, to represent the nation on the Eurovision stage. This tri -lingual song 
representing the Jewish state challenges the primary signifier of Hebrew as 
the national language. It is especially important given that Jews in Palestine 
revived Hebrew (a language used for primarily for liturgical purposes until 
the late nineteenth century) as an important aspect of the project of nation-
building (Kuzar 2001), a process which had its musical equivalent in rise of 
"Songs of the Land of Israel." 
The inspiration for the duo's collaboration resulted from the shared 
vision, musical and political, of the two artists. Both are singer-songwriters 
who possess an international pop aesthetic, have collaborated intermittently 
in the past, and are deeply invested in the issues of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. 3 Nini is a singer-songwriter of Jewish-Yemenite descent whose 
pop-folk style often includes elements of traditional Yemeni vocal styles 
and percussion. Nini has sold one million albums (Bronner 2009b), a high 
number for an artist from a country in which sales of 40,000 units constitute 
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a platinum album. Nini's sales record is a by-product of her performance 
career being more focused on international markets, especially Europe, 
where she is known as Noa, than on local markets (Bronner 2009b). She is 
also internationally known as a peace activist and a supporter of a two-state 
solution, and has been advocating the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza strip since the early 1990s. 
Her activism extends to showcasing multicultural representations as sym-
bolic of the potentials of coexistence, including performances and recordings 
with many Arab artists such as the Lebanese singer Nabil Salameh and the 
Franco-Algerian ral artist Khaled. Her activist approach has rendered her 
a symbol of progressive Israeli culture in international circles, and she has 
often been invited to perform at events hosted by the United Nations and at 
other symbolic peace-building occasions in front of world leaders, includ-
ing former US President Bill Clinton, Israeli President Shimon Peres, Pope 
John Paul II, and the Italian President Giorgio Napolitano. In addition, she 
has received numerous honors for her work from the United Nations, the 
Freemasons, and the president of Italy, among others. Nini is also known 
as a peace activist within Israel and often performs in events associated 
with the political left: in 1995, she sang at the peace rally in which Israel's 
prime-minister Yitschak Rabin was assassinated. Nini's popularity abroad 
and her association with peace-building initiatives are likely to have served 
as impetus for the Israeli Broadcasting Authorities' request that she represent 
Israel at Eurovision. While this choice preceded Israel's attack on Gaza, Nini's 
insistence on collaborating with Awad at a time when Israel was bound to 
face much international criticism and needed to project a benign, peace-
seeking image provided Israel with a tailor-made opportunity to promote 
such an image. 
In recent years Mira Awad has made a name for herself as an actress 
in Israeli theater and television. Awad began her musical career at the age 
of sixteen as a lead singer in an Arabic rock group called Semana; and, like 
Nini, she graduated from the Rimon School of Jazz and Contemporary 
Music, Israel's only educational institution teaching modern-day jazz, R&B, 
rock, and pop. Prior to her collaboration with Nini, she recorded one album 
(Bahlawan, or ''Acrobat''), an acoustic singer-songwriter project in Arabic 
and English. No Israeli record label wanted to take on the risk of promoting 
this album until Awad received the high levels of media exposure that came 
with her association with Nini (Kohavi 2009a). 
Awad was born to a Christian Arab-Israeli father from the Ramah village 
in the Galilee and a Bulgarian mother. In interviews, Awad sometimes identi-
fies herself as an "Israeli-Arab" and sometimes as "Palestinian-by-ethnicity 




identifications is related to the fact that, in Israel, ethnicity (with "Jewish" 
signifying ethnicity rather than religion in a Jewish-Arab binary) determines 
a differential access to full rights and responsibilities of citizenship, with 
full rights and responsibilities enjoyed exclusively by Jews. While Jewish 
Israelis are usually referred to as (un-hyphenated) Israelis, Palestinians with 
Israeli citizenship are often referred to as Israeli-Arabs or simply Arabs, 
highlighting their minoritized status. By calling herself Palestinian, Awad is 
also identifying with the Palestinians who reside in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (West Bank and Gaza), are not Israeli citizens, and aspire for a 
separate nation-state.4 This fraught set of identifications is shared by other 
Israeli-Palestinians who are, to different extents, integrated into the Israeli 
polity. Their identification with the Palestinian struggle for emancipation 
is greatly complicated by their own struggle as citizens aspiring to equal 
rights within the Jewish state (Amara and Schnell 2004; Blithe 2003; Schnell 
1994; Smooha 1999).5 
This is even truer for twice-minoritized Christian Arabs. Christians 
comprise approximately ten percent of the Arab population in Israel, which 
in turn comprises twenty percent of the total population. According to 
nan Shdema (2009), the past several decades have been characterized by 
increasing differentiation in the socio-political identifications of Muslim 
and Christian Arabs in Israel. Shdema argues that this has resulted from 
an increased Palestinian identification with Islam as a mobilizing force for 
national liberation, as evidenced by the Hamas victory in the 2005 elections 
in Gaza and the emergence ofIslamist movements in Israel, and a decreased 
affiliation with the Communist Party. In Israel's early years, Christian Arabs 
filled the gap created by the exodus of the traditionally Muslim Palestinian 
Arab leadership, and Christians became a salient part ofIsrael's Arab politi-
cal leadership, accounting for about fifty percent of Arab Knesset members 
that were particularly active in the Communist Party. In the 1990s, Meretz, 
a left -wing Zionist party included in the Rabin-Peres coalition government, 
drew many Christian Arabs, resulting in a decline of the Communist Party's 
non-religious power-base for the Arab minority in Israel and in an improve-
ment in the position of the Christian urban and middle class in particular 
(Tsimhoni 2001). Roda Kannaneh (2003) also cites the divisive policies 
of the Israeli state, which consciously creates differentiation between its 
Bedouin, Druze, Christian, and Muslim Palestinian minorities so that they 
don't coalesce into a unified Arab front, as a prominent factor in the more 
polarized current identifications of Muslim and Christian Arab citizens of 
Israel. In addition, the Christian-Arab community in Israel enjoys a higher 
socio-economic status than do Muslim-Arabs (Saar 2003), and being largely 
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urbanized, often in mixed Jewish-Arab cities such as Haifa, also enjoy a 
higher degree of amalgamation into secular Israeli society than do Muslims 
(Tsimhoni 2001). 
This is especially evident in the culture industry. According to Galit 
Dardashti (2009), the Israeli-Palestinian musicians most prominent on the 
Israeli music scene are Christians. Dardashti claims that this is due to Islam's 
ambivalent view of music, in contrast to the encouragement of musical 
activities in Palestinian churches, and also due to the fact that Christian 
Arab-Israelis enjoy a higher socio-economic status than Muslims, have fewer 
children on average, and can expend more resources on music education. 
In many ways, Awad's integration into the Israeli cultural establishment 
as both singer and actress is related to the socio-economic standing of her 
family and her educational trajectory. She spent several years as a child 
within the Israeli Hebrew-speaking secular education system (her father 
worked as a physician in Karmiel, a Jewish town), when the majority of 
Palestinian Israelis attend Arabic speaking schools within their communi-
ties; she studied at Rimon, and presently, she lives in Tel-Aviv, the hub of 
Jewish-Israeli cultural production, where she has participated in numerous 
theater and television productions. In an interview with a Ma' ariv reporter, 
Awad answered a journalist who asked her about the difference between 
her generation and previous generations ofIsraeli Palestinians active in the 
culture industry with the following words: 
We are the generation that can stop apologizing [for being Arabs]. Yes, 
it's a new generation that is completely from here. I was born in this 
country. My first language is Bulgarian, the second Hebrew, Arabic came 
only afterwards. There is no more than this. I am here and the Hebrew 
language surrounds me. I act in Hebrew theater and on television, and 
people around me speak Hebrew. So of course most of the time I speak 
Hebrew. (Nuriel 2007)6 
And in another Interview with Ma' ariv, Awad commented on the fact that 
during the period she studied at Haifa University, sometimes her Arab friends 
did not feel comfortable with the fact that she also had Jewish friends: 
One can think that if I speak with Jews, I will lose my identity. What does 
one thing have to do with the other? I will never forget, and it doesn't 
matter who will be my friends, that I am my father's daughter, whom the 
Israeli army expelled from his home in 1948. They accused me for trying 
to please "the enemy." What was I doing? Being sincere and human? You 




Awad's statement points to the conflict experienced by Israeli Palestinians, 
who are members of a disenfranchised minority within Israel while they 
participate in the economy and cultural life of secular Israel. In Awad's case, 
her self-labeling and role in representing Israel at Eurovision indicates the 
primacy of citizenship over ethnicity, despite their inherent conflicts and 
contradictions. 
Given the two singers' singer-songwriter aesthetic, five years of col-
laborative history, political views, and Nini's activism in Israel and abroad, 
it is understandable that when Nini was selected as the representative for 
Eurovision by the Israel Broadcasting Authority, she promptly predicated 
her consent on her pairing with Awad. Nini claims that she has been asked 
to represent Israel at Eurovision several times before, but had never agreed 
because she wanted to be recognized for her artistry as a quality singer-
songwriter. But at a time when other media opportunities had shrunk and 
Eurovision could reach millions, this was an opportune platform to send a 
message for peace; hence, collaborating with Awad was the natural choice 
for her (Avramovitz 2009). And as Nini explained during an interview with 
an OpEdNews reporter in May 2009, this representation was a conscious 
move made by the two singers who intended to promote both a message 
for peace and a pluralistic, muticulturalist Israel: 
Mira and I are very proud to be the first Arab-Jewish Israeli duo to go to 
Eurovision. We are also proud that upon our demand, the internal laws 
were changed and Arabic was allowed to be sung as a formal language 
representing Israel in the ESC. Our duo sheds light on the complexity 
of our situation here in the Middle East. Israel has a very large minority, 
almost 20 percent, of Palestinians, Christian (like Mira) and Muslim, who 
are Israeli citizens. This sector is still fighting for full integration into Is-
raeli society. This is separate from the Palestinians living in the occupied 
territories, who are fighting for their independence and the establishment 
of the state of Palestine. (Paz 2009) 
In a separate interview with The Guardian (McCarthey 2009a), Awad 
corroborated Nini's sentiments regarding the importance of a national 
imaginary constructed by pluralistic inclusivity as a means of struggling 
against the disenfanchisment ofIsraeli-Arabs within Israeli society. "I am a 
minority in the Israeli state," she said, "therefore it is my country now and 
forever. I believe I have to strive for my place in it and fight for an equal 
place in it ... " (McCarthey 2009a). The two singers remained firm in their 
decision to represent Israel at Eurovision, despite intense criticism of their 
partnership fueled by the war on Gaza. While both singers acknowledged 
that the public exposure and professional opportunities Eurovision might 
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provide were important for their individual careers, they insisted that the 
more important factor in their decision to perform together at the ESC 
was the opportunity to project the vision of an integrated Israel from an 
international stage. 
The Cultural Policy of the Israeli Broadcasting System 
and the Nini-Awad Collaboration 
The duo's collaboration had the practical effect of changing the exclusion-
ary norms and practices of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority (lEA), which 
segregates Arabic language programming into separate channels on both 
television and radio, despite the obvious presence of Arabic music and 
cultural idioms in mainstream Israeli expressive culture in the past couple of 
decades. The lEA broadcasts twenty hours per week of Arabic programming 
on its Arabic language television network, and eighteen hours per day on its 
Arabic shortwave radio channel "The Voice of Israel in Arabic;' which is not 
music centered, but broadcasts mostly talk shows. On its primary channels, 
Israeli national television ensures that most of its schedule-seventy percent 
on average-consists oflocallyproduced Hebrew-language broadcasts. The 
rest of the programming typically consists of English-speaking imported 
programming, including soap operas, detective series, and feature films. A 
similar picture characterizes government-owned radio's music-centered 
channels. Arabic is rarely heard on national Israeli radio channels outside 
of the specialized "Voice of Israel in Arabic" (Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2009). While there are currently several pirate Arabic radio stations 
operating in Israel, the lack of institutionalized support for Arabic music 
leaves little opportunity for the promotion of local Palestinian-Israeli 
musical content. 
Israeli sociologist and popular music scholar Motti Regev (1995) argues 
that local Israeli culture is a field of unequal power relations in which the 
construction and definition of what is recognized as authentic national 
culture is determined by the dominant agents' invention of this tradition 
(Bourdieu 1993). In Israel the leading cultural organizations-including 
the lEA's five publicly-owned radio stations, its "Voice of Israel" television 
station, as well as numerous privately owned broadcasting channels-assume 
a predominantly Western-inclined Hebrew speaking audience and broadcast 
a variety of imported programming from the West, with local television 
productions in Hebrew, and local musical content comprised primarily of 
pop-rock in Hebrew. According to Regev, this relegates Arabic music to the 




do not fit in the dominant power's national narrative. This process occurs 
despite the presence of a large Arabic speaking minority, the fact that ap-
proximately half the Jewish population in Israel originate in Arab countries 
and share an affinity for Arabic music, and the obvious presence of Arabic 
musical elements in many Jewish -Israeli music genres from muzika mizrahit 
(oriental pop) to Israeli rock. 
The lack of airtime for Arabic music on Israeli broadcasting channels 
has discouraged the larger local record labels (which also act as Israeli 
subsidiaries to the global majors, and their products typically receive the 
most airtime on radio and television) from releasing locally-based Arabic 
language and music albums into the market. Small independent music 
labels tend to specialize either in muzika mizrahit or in genres with small 
market shares such as "traditional" ethnic musics or trance, but there are 
none dedicated to Arabic music. As alternative promotional avenues to the 
media and music industry are rare in Israel, this has meant that Arabic music 
has been relegated to a marginal place in the Israeli cultural fabric. 8 This 
marginzalization, along with the fact that, as Israeli citizens, Palestinian-
Israeli musicians are often unwelcome in Arabic-speaking countries in 
the region (Dardashti 2009), denies Israeli-Palestinians the opportunity to 
commercially produce original music for the local market and to compete 
with Arabic music imports promoted on the airwaves of neighboring 
countries (Regev 1995). 
In this context, it is easy to understand how, for Nini, the release of the 
duo's tri-lingual song into local broadcast media, with the support of the 
IBA, marked an important milestone toward the public acceptance of Arabic 
cultural products in Israel. Awad stated that she initially self-released her 
album Bahlawan because record labels were not interested in releasing it, 
claiming that "it was not marketable" (Kohavi 2009a). Following Eurovision, 
together with the release of the duo's full-length album in June 2009,Awad's 
album was re-released by one of Israel's larger record labels, Helicon, in 
June 2009. Awad claimed that she did not expect it to receive much airplay, 
and that one of the government radio stations (Reshet Gimmel-the IBA's 
pop station) refused to play the single because of a policy that stipulates 
fifty percent Hebrew broadcasting. While airplay rates for Bahlawan are 
impossible to obtain, the album sold over 10,000 units by February 2010 
(Biluy Plus 2009), a testimony to the public's receptivity to the project. 
Awad also received the "Singer of the Year" (2009) award from the "Voice 
of Israel in Arabic" station (Naim 2010). It remains to be seen whether, 
despite the setbacks, the Nini-Awad collaboration has opened a space for 
other Palestinian artists within the Israeli culture industry. 
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While Nini highlighted the fact that the duo's song resulted in the 
change of cultural policy guidelines of the IBA, the fact that the song was 
sung in Hebrew, Arabic, and English at the ESC stirred no responses of 
approval or disapproval in the Israeli media. I attribute this non-chalant 
acceptance of tri-lingual national representation and the inclusion of 
Arabic as a national signifier to a combination of factors: the 1990s peace 
process; the growing power-base of of Mizrahi-Jews (Jews that originated 
in predominantly Islamic countries) in the Knesset since the late 1970s, 
along with their increased presence in the cultural media landscape after 
decades of marginalization; and the growing interest in world music over 
the past couple of decades (Horowitz 1999 and 2005, Perelson 1998). All 
these factors have contributed to a growing acceptance of Arabic cultural 
elements in popular culture as well as to the de-centering of Hebrew from 
its status as the sole icon of appropriate Israeli "authenticity." 
According to Motti Regev and Edwin Seroussi (2004:19-20) the de-
centering of ivriut, or Hebrewism (reflected in both use of language and 
musical genres), as the universe of meanings that separates Israelis from 
others, which predominated in the first decades following the founding 
of the State of Israel, was the result of the effects of globalization-the 
intensified dissemination of products and materials of the international 
culture industry. The "globalized Israeliness" that has emerged in recent 
decades was reflected in music first through the emergence of local rock 
and pop groups who listened to and participated in the Western popular 
music developments of the 1960s and 1970s, initially viewed as a radical 
departure from appropriate Israeliness. A further divergence from the 
Hebrewism constructed by the largely Eastern-European Zionist founders 
occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, when second and third generation 
Mizrahi Israelis (most of the Jewish immigration from Islamic countries 
occurred in the 1950s) rejected the hegemonic paradigm constructed by 
Eastern-European based Zionism. In music, they highlighted their ethnicity 
by creating a hybrid popular musical genre called musika mizrahit, a fusion 
of rock and pop with oriental melismatic vocal styles and instruments such 
as the darbukka drum and the oud. Through the 1980s muzika mizrahitwas 
marginalized from the mainstream culture industry, though it flourished 
through the circulation of cassettes, mostly in open-air markets and bazaars 
(Horowitz 1999). In the 1990s there was a growing presence of Mizrahi 
culture in the Israeli mainstream culture industry, as well as a larger Mizrahi 
political power base in the Knesset. These developments, along with the 
peace process that took place in the 1990s, resulted in Arabic culture and 




tion (Horowitz 2005). As Galit Dardashti has noted, "The signing of the 
Oslo Accords was a watershed event for the receptivity of Israelis to Arab 
culture" (2009: 64). This acceptance was exemplified by a higher acceptance 
of muzika mizrahit, a growing interest in classical Arabic music and a new 
audience for numerous collaborative projects of musika etnit (ethnic music), 
that incorporated both Jewish and Palestinian Israelis during the 1990s 
(Brinner 2009).9 Musika etnit represents a form of Israeli oriental music 
that is distinguished from muzika mizrahit in that it calls upon a variety 
of classical Eastern traditions often mixed with classical music and/or jazz 
rather than rock or pop, its practitioners and listeners align themselves with 
a world music scene (Brinner 2009, Dardashti 2001), and it is marketed as 
world music abroad. 
This growing interest ofIsraelis in world music and in muzika etnit over 
the past couple of decades, coupled with recent immigration ofJews from the 
territories of the former Soviet Union, resulted in 10 cally-formed ensembles 
that play repertoire in the styles and languages of their countries of origin-
from Tajikistan to the Caucasus-as part of the Israeli cultural fabric. In 
other words, elements of popular culture currently being incorporated into 
the Israeli mainstream come not only from the West, but from all of Israel's 
diasporic and local sources. IO While such representations of Israel's diverse 
ethnicities are not new, their direct impact on popular culture had previously 
been marginal, as in the days of the predominant Hebrewism paradigm 
they were often showcased as colorful relics of a cultural past that had been 
cast-off in favor of integration into Israeli society. As Ben Brinner (2009) 
suggests, in Zionist ideology Diaspora represented the weak, oppressed Jew, 
and new Israelis were supposed to supplant the culture linked with it as well, 
in the process of assimilation. The cultural model into which all immigrants 
were to assimilate into was constructed by the Western-inclined Ashkenazy 
(Occidental) founding fathers. 
In contrast, today a younger generation ofIsraelis is seeking to incorpo-
rate cultural "roots" into contemporary idioms. These trends have resulted in 
the proliferation of new styles and genres alongside Anglo-American imports 
and local Hebrew variations of rock and pop. In live performances especially, 
languages other than Hebrew and English are presently not an anomaly. 
Today Israeli fans can attend hip-hop shows performed in Russian, Arabic, 
Hebrew, and English (Ungerleider 2006). The commercially successful Idan 
Reichel Project (2002) merged Ethiopian music and the Amharic language 
with Hebrew lyrics and electronica (and was marketed abroad as world 
music). Dana International, the transgendered dance artist and 1998 win-
ner of Eurovision, sings in Hebrew and Arabic, and Israel's 2007 ESC entry 
by the rock band Teapacks ("Push the Button"), featured lyrics in Hebrew, 
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French, and English. All these global-local permutations of styles, genres 
and languages are a testament to the continual development of what Regev 
and Seroussi termed "globalized Israeliness." Hence, despite the increased 
polarization between Israelis and Palestinians in the decade following the 
peace process, the pervasive presence of such elements in popular Israeli 
culture has probably rendered the IBA's Hebrew-centered guidelines and 
cultural policy highly outdated in relationship to what can be accepted as 
"authentically" Israeli, linguistically and musically, in the contemporary 
mainstream imagination. This marks a tremendous shift from previous 
decades; it is hard to imagine such an attitude regarding the appropriate 
linguistic representation of Israel at the ESC in the 1970s or 1980s. 
The Discourse Surrounding Israel's 2009 ESC Entry: "Again We 
Have a Political Eurovision"11 
Nini and Awad were positioning themselves internationally as pop icons 
bearing a message of peace and embodying a multicultural representation 
of the nation. On the other hand, Palestinian artists and intellectuals from 
both sides of the border as well as left -leaning Jewish-Israeli artists and peace 
activists viewed the duo's representation ofIsrael at the ESC as a sanctioning 
of the violence Israel has launched on Gaza, and a contribution to Israeli 
propaganda (Rizzo 2009). These individuals perceived the fact that the duo 
was officially chosen as Israel's ESC representatives a day after Israel launched 
its war on Gaza as a cynical move on behalf of the state, in which the role of 
the two singers, and especially Awad's, was that of accomplices to the violence. 
The day following the nomination, they sent an open letter to Awad: 
The Israeli government is sending the two of you to Moscow as part of 
its propaganda machine that is trying to create the appearance of Jewish-
Arab co-existence under which it carries the daily massacre of Palestinian 
civilians ... Please, Mira, for the future of Gaza and for the future of every 
child in this land-Arabs and Jews-don't collaborate with the killing 
machine. (Yudilevitch 2009b; Kohavi 2009b) 
The highly emotional tone of the letter, which positions a songstress as the 
Israeli government's tool of propaganda and one that collaborates with the 
"killing machine," demonstrates how the socio-political context in which 
this specific collaboration came into being invested it with meanings literally 
construed as matters of life and death. The request from Awad not to col-
laborate with the Israeli government is especially charged, as "collaborator" 
is a label often used for Palestinian informants who work in the service of 




that every contribution to the false image built by the Israeli state "allows 
the Israeli army to use another 10 tons of explosives, another phosphorous 
bomb:' 
This plea, directed to Awad, outlines the view that Israeli-Arabs who 
seek to be absorbed into and prominently represented in the Israeli national 
mainstream in effect become the instruments of oppression of their own 
people. This group of individuals was contesting and reconstructing the 
boundaries of ethnicity, nation, and power hierarchies advanced by the two 
singers. Their discursive move conflates the real violence of armed conflict 
with the symbolic violence enacted through musical representation of the 
dominant power. It shows how in extreme conflict situations, violence can 
become a trope in the negotiation of identity politics through which all 
subjective experience is filtered. 
The Ha' aretz newspaper reported that the Israeli Broadcasting 
Authorities responded with the statement that Eurovision is a cultural event 
"aimed at creating musical dialogue between the various countries that take 
part in it;' and that the selection of Nini and Awad was a decision based 
on the professionalism of the two artists "that also expresses the aspiration 
for coexistence, which transcends politics" (Kohavi 2009b). This response 
dislodges the committee's decision from the realm of politics, as it positions 
Eurovision as a cultural, rather than political event, and highlights the two 
artists' professionalism-in other words, their artistic capabilities, rather 
than their message-as the reason for the choices made. At the same time, 
the response also explicitly highlights the political weight of the message for 
coexistence embodied by the duo in its decision-making. As Simon Frith 
(1996) has pointed out, within discourse about music, aesthetics, or what 
sounds good, is often conflated with ethics: the determination of what is 
good about music and why. This conflation of ethics and aesthetics is also 
evident in Israel's president Shimon Peres's statement from March 2009, 
following the selection of the representative song via a telethon, in which 
he expressed his admiration of the duo "for what they are doing for their 
people and the sake of peace" (Reuters News Agency 2009). 
The ethical investment in the collaboration was attached not only to the 
value of coexistence, but also to official public policy that seeks to legitimize 
Israel as a superior moral entity in the region. This decision is congruent with 
Israel's attempts to fashion a democratic self-image, and to position Israel's 
democratic heritage as morally superior to neighboring Arab countries in the 
eyes of the Western world. Israel's democratic heritage is often used by Israeli 
officials as evidence of its moral superiority to neighboring Arab countries 
(see for example, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyaho interview 
with CBC Canada, May 30,2010) .12 Participation in the ESC has always been 
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connected with Israel's wish to establish cultural alliances that cultivate its 
national imaginary in association with the Europeanized West, rather than 
with the Orient in which it is located. Israel joined the ESC in 1973 in the 
midst of the Cold War, when Eurovision consisted of Western European en-
tries, with the exception of Yugoslavia (Bohlman 2004).13 Initially conceived 
in the 1950s as a means of bringing together war-torn Europe through a 
light entertainment program, the EBU launched Eurovision in 1956, with 
seven participating countries, all located in Western Europe. Following 
the dismantling of the Soviet Union many Central and Eastern European 
countries joined the ESC, but even today, there are very few participating 
non-European countries in the ESC. Sending an ethnically-mixed duo of 
singers to the ESC provided an opportunity for Israel to leverage an image of 
itself as a tolerant democracy deserving of inclusion first among progressive, 
Westernized nations and more broadly, with the European Union. J4 
The selection of the duo as Israel's ESC representatives is also congruent 
with Israel's policy of using cultural exports to mitigate Israel's negative 
image abroad. In the months that followed the war on Gaza, cultural exports 
were further mobilized to diffuse the international isolation Israel felt after 
the war ended. Arye Mekel, Israel's Foreign Ministry's deputy director 
general for cultural affairs, stated in an interview with the New York Times in 
March 2009 that Israel has allotted an additional two million US dollars for 
international cultural campaigns in the coming fiscal year, adding: "We will 
send well-known novelists and writers overseas, theater companies, exhibits. 
This way you show Israel's prettier face, so we are not thought of purely in 
the context of war" (Bronner 2009a). In December 2009 right-wing Knesset 
member Alex Miller of the Yisrael Beytenu party suggested that the Knesset 
should hold a special parliamentary session to discuss how Israel can better 
prepare for the ESC by choosing the performers and the song as well as by 
launching a public relations campaign, stating that "a good performance 
together with good public relations will serve Israel's artists, but could also 
be a great opportunity to boost the tourist industry" (Lis 2009). As these 
statements show, the Israeli state invests in cultural exports as a means of 
improving its damaged international image, as well as gaining political and 
economic capital, utilizing culture as a diplomatic tool to divert international 
attention from Israel's aggressions. So while Nini and Awad's collaboration 
was intended to be a message for peace and coexistence, it was also used as 
a showcase for a democratic, multicultural fa<;:ade. 
While Awad was the main target of the first round of public criticism 
of the duo's collaboration, Nini was a primary target for the second. The 
duo was scheduled to perform at a fundraising concert for Gazans injured 




to the benefit, during the last week of the war, Nini published an open letter 
to Palestinians in Gaza,15 calling on them to "join hands" in eradicating 
fanaticism. In the letter she showed compassion for their cause and culture, 
but also stated the following: 
But, now, today, I know that deep in your hearts YOU WISH for the demise 
of this beast called Hamas who has terrorized and murdered you, who 
has turned Gaza into a trash heap of poverty, disease and misery. Who in 
the name of "Allah" has sacrificed you on the bloody altar of pride and 
greed ... 
I can only wish for you that Israel will do the job we all know needs to be 
done, and finally RID YOU of this cancer, this virus, this monster called 
fanaticism, today, called Hamas. And that these killers will find what little 
compassion may still exist in their hearts and STOP using you and your 
children as human shields for their cowardice and crimes. (Nini 2009b, 
emphasis in original) 16 
Nini's letter enraged the same group that objected to the duo's performance 
at the ESC, and many Arab and Jewish Israelis in the entertainment world 
urged her to take her words back in a petition signed by Jewish Israeli 
film director Udi Aloni along with many other leftist Jewish-Israelis and 
Palestinian -Israelis active in the Israeli culture industry. The petition stated 
that without a public retraction of her statement, her participation in the 
benefit concert for Gazan victims would taint the event. Addressed to the 
performance's organizers, the petition stated: "Nini's performance will 
strengthen the hypocritical position of Israel's leaders, that express their 
regret over children who were killed 'by accident' and then offer to help 
rebuild Gaza" (Yudilevitch 2009b). The event's organizers told Nini the 
event was centered on the question of accountability for the State of Israel's 
actions in Gaza, and wanted to be sure the singer identified with this cause. 
Following this denunciation, and the event organizers' request from Nini 
to accommodate the petitioners request, Nini and Awad cancelled their 
participation in the event. In response to the cancelilation, Juliano Mer-
Khamis, an Arab-Israeli actor and film directOl·17 and one of the petition's 
authors, wrote the following in a letter published in both Palestinian and 
Israeli newspapers and websites: 
There is nothing more patronizing, arrogant or presumptuous than to 
tell people who have freely elected one political movement or another, 
that it is a cancer. One can't help but be disgusted by people who support 
Operation Cast Lead and then buy blankets for the handicapped children 
that remain alive. You can't kill the Gazans and cry over them too. (Yudi-
levitch 2009b) 
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As with the letter that asked Awad to withdraw from the ESC, the visceral 
language of this statement shows that in the context of violent conflict, 
a musical performance can become a context in which for many, what is 
being negotiated is absolute questions of life and death. For Mer-Khamis, 
Nini's stance in her letter and subsequent volunteering to perform at the 
Gaza benefit was a hypocritical move that amounted to "killing" and then 
"crying over it." The last line in this statement also confronts the prevalent 
trope of "shooting and crying" employed in the Israeli media. This trope 
encapsulates the struggle of the Israeli soldier who is torn between the ethi-
cal duty of protecting his country and the unethical practice of harming a 
civilian population, including women and children, as part of his wartime 
duties. The trope has roots in Israeli literature harkening back to stories by 
writers such as S. Izhar that portrayed the moral ambivalence of soldiers 
regarding the Palestinians' expulsion in 1948. However, this trope has 
been used most extensively in the Israeli media since the eruption of the 
1987 intifada, as the obvious imbalance of power between Israeli soldiers 
carrying machine guns and backed by armored vehicles and Palestinian 
children throwing rocks became a loaded visual image that characterized 
the Israeli occupation. "Shooting and crying" emphasizes the ethical hu-
manity of the Israel Defense Forces soldiers as they fight against a civilian 
populationY In addition, Mer-Khamis, in his letter, legitimizes Hamas.as 
a democratically-elected government, thus turning around Israel's claim 
to being the sole democracy in the region. His discourse posits a national 
imaginary of Israel as an oppressive tyrant, and of the Gazans' as that of an 
oppressed democracy. 
While the duo cancelled their appearance at the Gaza benefit, they 
remained committed to the ESC performance. Both singers claimed that 
they understood the emotions that their collaboration had evoked in the 
context of the violence, but as Nini said during an interview with a reporter 
from The Guardian, millions would be watching the duo on stage and this 
was their opportunity to send a message of peace (McCarthy 2009b). No 
Arab-Israelis publicly supported Awad's decision. The silence was noticed 
by Jewish-Israeli journalists who supported the duo. When the duo released 
their joint album in June, David Forman, a Jerusalem-Post columnist voiced 
the following opinion in an article titled "Counterpoint: Every Second Offers 
Another Chance:"19 
Is it just possible that joint artistic ventures of Arabs and Jews might 
positively serve Arab interests? After all, there is an image out there that 
Arabs, especially Muslims, are all terrorists, strapping suicide belts onto 
their bodies or killing each other with impunity as is the case in Iraq (and 
Gaza) or crashing planes into the Twin Towers. Might one consider that 




decapitated journalist Daniel Pearl? Why must every Arab-Jewish enter-
prise be portrayed by a significant majority within the Arab community 
as propaganda? One would think- or at least, hope- that those who try 
to foster reconciliation would be encouraged. (Forman 2009) 
It is obvious from this description that the author feels there are few moder-
ate, or at least non-fundamentalist, Arabs (especially Muslims): the images 
of Arabs "strapping suicide belts;' "crashing planes," and decapitating a 
journalist are not only "out there," as he points out, but very much alive 
and resonating in his own writing. In this the author echoes the sentiments 
of many among the Israeli leadership, who feel that there is no political 
leadership on the Palestinian side that is moderate enough to constitute a 
reasonable partnership in a dialogue towards peace. So in setting Awad as 
an exception to the rule among Palestinians, Forman implicitly advances 
the view that the majority of (Muslim) Palestinians are fanatics with whom 
no dialogue can be conducted. 
The author also pointed out that while in Israel there are hundreds of 
NGOs working to promote human rilghts and civil liberties, there are few 
such organizations in the Arab world, and that the few Arab NGOs that 
there are criticize Israel government policies and infringements on human 
rights, but refrain from self-reflection. Forman further stated that " ... what 
is truly tragic is that Arab human rights NGOs are always willing to join 
with Israeli human rights NGOs to uncover civil liberties abuses that Israelis 
commit, but are rarely willing to partner with the Mira Awads of the Arab 
world who try to foster understanding between Arabs and Jews" (Forman 
2009). What this commentary establishes is further implicit justification 
for an entrenched, hard-line position on the Israeli side: if only Israelis are 
capable of admitting to and addressing wrongs in their society, how could 
a space be created for dialogue with the other side? 
What Forman is not looking at, however, is what he accuses Arab NGOs 
of doing: reflecting on the side in whose name he speaks. He is glossing over 
the fact that Israel controls the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and that the 
NGOs that operate there are operating under severe constraints determined 
by the conditions of the occupation. While it is true that in most of the 
neighboring Arab countries, NGOs operate locally under the constraints 
of non-democratic regimes, Israel's perceived tolerance does not extend 
to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, where Israel's heavy handedness in 
handling dissent amounted to several decades of military rule and violent 
suppressions of the 1987 and 2000 intifada: it is discriminatory policies 
within Israel and human rights infringements in the occupied territories 
that necessitate the work of Israeli human rights NGOs. Additionally, while 
Israel does practice "open politics" within its borders, Forman does not take 
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into account that openness can sometimes be the privilege of the powerful. 
What lies behind the author's applaud for the collaboration and especially 
for Awad is the same national imaginary cultivated by the state apparatus 
that positions Israel's moral superiority over its neighbors as a democratic 
and pluralistic state tolerant of contesting voices from within. The author 
does not take into account in this imaginary the contradictions inherent in 
the projection of the moral superiority of those in power, that at the same 
time also expects the "immoral" subaltern to address the dominant power 
on grounds that the dominant prescribes. 
International Resonance 
The 2009 Eurovision was held between May 12 and May 16 in Moscow with 
forty-two participating countries. The finals, which were broadcast on May 
16, included twenty-five countries: the host country, France, Germany, Spain 
and the UK (which are considered the "Big Four" in the EBU and are pre-
qualified), along with twenty countries selected over two semi-finals. The duo 
was placed sixteenth in the finals, and shortly after, they released a full-length 
album titled There Must Be Another Way. But, more importantly, interna-
tional profiling of the debates within Israel, the music, and performances of 
the two artists abroad all provided reason and opportunity for international 
actors to join the symbolic battleground. The international circulation of 
Nini's letter to the Gazans in January, and the reactions to it within Israel, led 
the blog Irish -for-Palestine to call on "all Europeans who support Palestine" 
to give Israel no points at the ESC for its "disgusting propaganda" prior to 
the contest. 20 Following Eurovision, at a joint performance of Nini and 
Awad at the Notte de Taranta festival in Melpignano, Italy (where Nini is an 
honorary citizen) in August 2009, protestors in the audience held up a sign 
that read "Noa and Mira, accomplices in the killing machine. Israel=Nazis" 
(Nini 2009a). The Palestinian Solidarity Movement in Spain also held a 
boycott campaign against Nini. During her September 2009 performance 
at the Diada, a city park in Barcelona, at a festival celebrating Catalunia's 
national culture day, protestors whistled and booed, waved Palestinian flags 
and scarves, and held up signs reading "Boycott Israel," while her local fans 
applauded her (Expatica 2009).21 Such reactions demonstrate the ways in 
which the local debate in Israel/Palestine regarding the duo's collaboration 
became a globalized issue animated by pro-Palestine movements. 
There was also support for the duo in the international arena. Nini claims 
that the duo has received enthusiastic e-mails from fans in Lebanon, Syria, 
and Qatar, among other places (Paz 2009). Support also came from jour-




(where the Notte de Tarranta festival is held), and from former Beatle Paul 
McCartney. While on tour in Israel the previous year, McCartney joined 
OneVoice, a grassroots NGO of Palestinians and Israelis from both sides 
of the border that "aims to amplify the voice of Israeli and Palestinian 
moderates" (OneVoice 2009). Both Nini and Awad joined the organization 
as board members prior to McCartney becoming a member. McCartney 
wrote a letter to President Obama to make him aware of the organization, 
which was published on the organization's website and quoted in various 
press articles. The letter included a line stating that " ... the symbolism of 
two people from both sides coming together to spread their message of peace 
via music is exciting and inspiring for me. I hope President Obama looks 
into this organisation and feels that OneVoice could be part of a peaceful 
solution" (Pineda 2009).22 The letter was mentioned on CNN on the day of 
the contest, providing the duo much comfort in the midst of the controversy 
surrounding their collaboration. When the duo released their joint album 
in June 2009, they included a cover of the Beatles song "We Can Work It 
Out" on the album. 
As internationally-based liberation movements, music celebrities, 
foreign journalists, and perhaps even presidents join the debate, the deploy-
ment of music to construct national imaginaries is no longer limited to the 
groups that live within the boundaries of such imaginaries. Being interpreted 
through the conceptual prism of actors distant from the scene, the interna-
tional discourse regarding the meanings of Nini and Awad's collaboration 
adds further layers to the hierarchies of moral and political order (Stokes 
1994) shaped by local actors. The circulation of such imaginaries in the media 
shapes contemporary imaginaries of Israel, Palestine, and the contesting 
ethnic and national affiliations constituted by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
both in Israel and abroad. In this way, the struggles of the local come to be 
negotiated by the global. 
Conclusion 
The ESC provided an arena surrounding which symbolic warfare, using 
the seemingly benign exchange of glitz and pop tunes, paralleled the actual 
war, in which competing national imaginaries were fought for with flesh 
and blood. The reported number of casualties during the war on Gaza was 
over 1,300 on the Palestinian side and thirteen on the Israeli side (BBC News 
2009), numbers that highlight the tremendous power discrepancies between 
the State and the stateless in the region. But the mediated, discursive struggle 
surrounding the collaboration of a Jewish-Arab duo in their representation 
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ofIsrael at the 2009 Eurovision suggests that the role of expressive culture in 
conflict situations is both reflective and constitutive of national imaginaries 
constructed through and by such conflicts. It is in both political and cultural 
arenas that meanings given to place, ethnicity, and nation are socially and 
experientially constructed. 
Notes 
1. Some countries that do not have the technical capacity to hold telethons still rely on a 
panel of jurists to determine the voting; other countries rely solely on the telethon with a 
panel of jurists used only as backup in case of technical difficulties (Haan, Dijkstra and 
Dijkstra 2005). In Israel, experts from the Israeli Broadcasting Authorities select the artist. 
Both the representative song and the votes for other countries' songs are selected through a 
combination of the public and the jurists' votes. 
2. Co-authored by Nini, Awad, and Gil Dor-who has been Nini's musical collaborator in 
the past fifteen years-the song's verses alternate between Hebrew and Arabic. Each singer 
addresses the other as family, as sisters who are walking a long, difficult road, a journey ac-
companied by pain and tears, but doing so hand in hand. The refrain is in English: "And when 
I cry, I cry for both of us / My pain has no name / And when I cry, I cry / To the merciless 
sky and say / There must be another way." The last line of the refrain repeats in unison, four 
times each time the refrain is sung, its message taking on an anthemic quality. 
3. In addition to singing in peace rallies, Nini maintains a blog in which she frequently includes 
political commentary. Awad has in the past supported Hadash, Israel's Communist Party, 
which also supports Israel's withdrawal from all the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the 
recognition of Palestinian Israelis as a national minority within Israel's borders. 
4. Beyond the issues of citizenship, labels commonly used in every-day discourse that distin-
guish ethnicity, nationality and religion in Israel, such as Palestinian, Israeli-Palestinian, Arab, 
Israeli-Arab, Israeli (usually connoting Israeli-Jew) or Yemenite, are highly complicated in 
their conflation of ethnic, national, regional, and religious significations (Brinner 2004). For 
example, while Palestinian-Israeli may be self-negating in the context of the conflict, Iraqi 
(-Jew) indicates place of origin and associated ethnicity and may be indicative of cultural 
heritage, but not present citizenship nor religious practice. As there is no current consensus 
on appropriate terminology, in this paper I use the labels preferred by the subjects or, in 
the absence of such information, the descriptive labeling by which they are characterized 
in media discourse, as well as the terminology (often inconsistent) relating to the subject 
matter in relevant academic publications. 
5. According to Sami Smooha (1999), Arab citizens in Israel who have retained citizenship 
since 1948 have been undergoing a dual process of Israelization and Palestinianization. 
Smooha maintains th;tt the majority of this group does not wish to assimilate into the Jewish 
majority, and this majority does not want to assimilate them. Hence, many institutions such 
as the school systems are separate, and Israeli-Arab children attend Arabic speaking schools. 
Separated from the Palestinian community since 1948, the West Bank and the Gaza strip 
were annexed by Israel in 1967, marking the resumption of intensive contact between Israeli 
Arabs and Palestinians living in the occupied territories. The exclusion of Israeli Arabs from 
the mainstream and the renewal of contact between the Palestinian communities resulted 




their aspirations for national independence. In parallel, Smooha also observes a process of 
Israelization through which Israeli Arabs have been increasingly integrated into the Israeli 
mainstream-absorbing Israeli ways of life and the Hebrew language, consuming Hebrew 
media, working within the Israeli economy, accepting the right of Israel to exist as a state, 
participating in Israel's parliamentary politics, and over time, increasingly viewing Israel 
as their country. Smooha wrote his assessment of the dual process of Palestinianization 
and Israelization in1999, prior to the disintegration of the Oslo peace process in October 
2000. According to Alexander Bligh (2003), the human suffering and economic depriva-
tion experienced by the Palestinians of the occupied territories following the 2000 intifada 
resulted in a growing number of Israeli-Arabs who see themselves as an inseparable part of 
the Palestinian people. Muhammad Amara and Itzhak Schnell (2003) also credit the 2000 
killing of thirteen Israeli-Arabs during a pro-Palestinian demonstration as a watershed 
event in which Israeli-Arabs started to question their identification with their civil identity 
as Israelis and have begun to aspire either to transform Israel into a non-Zionist state or to 
be recognized as a national minority. 
6. All translations from Hebrew were made by the author. 
7. Regev is using a play of words to highlight his point. Present -absentee status in Israel refers 
to Palestinians who fled or were expelled from their homes during the 1948 war (the war of 
independence for Israelis, the "Naqba;' or catastrophe, for Palestinians) but who remained 
within the borders of Israel as internally displaced people, as well as to their descendents. 
Most present absentees were denied the right to return to their homes and properties, which 
were expropriated by the government for other uses, following the war. 
8. According to Ben Brinner (2009), employment opportunities for Palestinian Israelis consist 
mainly of performances at weddings and other festivities where they are most often asked 
to play popular Egyptian classics and current Arabic pop from neighboring countries, so 
they have little opportunity to introduce original content to the Palestinian community in 
Israel. The lack of support for Arabic music in the Jewish-dominated Israeli music and media 
industry, and the lack of such industry within the Arab sector of the population, further 
compounds the predicament of Palestinian Israeli musicians. 
9. The annual Culture of Peace festival and the International Oud festival showcase classical 
Arabic music in theaters attended by a mixed audience that includes Mizrahi and Ashkenazi 
Jews as well as Palestinian-Israelis. 
10. One such example is the Alaev family-a dynasty of musicians from Tajikistan-who have 
recently collaborated with members of Balkan Beat Box-a group that claims leadership in the 
new Gypsy-rock movement and that combines "roots firmly planted all around the Mediter-
ranean rim" with "solid and rock and reggae foundations" (Balkan Beat Box 2010). 
11. Title of an article in Ma'ariv (Suissa 2009). 
12. For example, in an interview about the UN non-proliferation treaty (of nuclear weapons), 
Prime Minister Netanyahu stated: "I thought that was a particularly distorted and flawed 
resolution because it singled out Israel, the only true democracy in the Middle East and the 
only country anywhere on Earth threatened with annihilation" (Canadian Broadcasting 
Company Website 2010). 
13. It must be noted here that in 1973, the year of the Yom Kippur war, Israel also had no 
options for cultivating regional alliances. Relationships with neighboring countries could 
be only be imagined following the 1979 signing of the peace treatise with Egypt and later 
with Jordan. But notions of the self are always created through the construction of difference 
(Yuval-Davis 2003). The historical bias of the Israeli leadership towards Western alliances, 
Nili Belkind 
especially the United States and Western Europe, and the marginalization of Mizrahi culture, 
highlight the fact that in many ways, Israeli popular imagination was also self-constructed 
as a foreign implant in a hostile region. 
14. While Israel joined Eurovision to further cultural alliances with the West, to-date, all 
its entries that have won first place at the ESC were Mizrahi singers ofYemenite descent: 
Izhar Cohen won in 1978 (with the entry "A-Ba-Ni-Bi"); Gali Atari won the following year 
(with the entry "Halleluyah") and Dana International won in 1998 (with the song "Diva"). 
Historically, Israeli -Yemenite singers have been most successful in "crossover" productions, 
through idiomatically mastering both muzika mizrahit or traditional Yemenite music and 
mainstream popular genres. The aforementioned Ofra Haza's success at the 1983 Eurovision 
bolsters this list. It is possible that this noted ability also enhanced their capacity to compete 
successfully at the ESC. 
15. The original letter was published on iPeace, an "international social network which has 
more than 14,000 members from 180 countries" (iPeace 2009) and later quoted partially or 
in full on other news websites. 
16. In a later interview given to Ma'ariv (Avramovitz 2009) Nini said she was compelled to 
write this letter following the news she received of Hamas members throwing Fatah sup-
porters off rooftops and shooting their legs. In addition, a peace activist friend from Gaza 
(a Fatah supporter as well) encouraged her in a phone call to write the letter. 
17. It is unclear whether Mer-Khamis refers to himself as an Israeli-Arab, but the articles 
published on the Nini-Awad topic refer to him as such. Mer-Khamis is the son of an Arab-
Israeli father and a Jewish-Israeli mother. His mother was an activist who established a 
youth theater in the refugee camp of Jenin (in the Occupied Palestinian Territories) with 
the purpose of providing an outlet for Palestinian youth to channel their anger and pain to 
creative works. Both mother and son were active in this project for many years. 
18. For examples and analysis of the "shooting and crying" trope in contemporary media, 
see Benvenisti 2004, Harel2009, and Klein 2008. 
19. Virtually all the songs on the album follow the theme of hope and reconciliation. The 
title of Forman's article is a play of words on one of the album's offerings, titled "Second 
Chance" in English and "Every Second" in Hebrew. 
20. Irish 4 Palestine Blog (2009). 
21.See also the Palestinian Solidarity Movement in Spain, available online at http://aturem-
laguerra.org (accessed October 2, 2009). 
22. See http://blog.onevoicemovement.org/one_ voice/2009/05/press-release-paul-mccartney-
calls-on -presiden t -obama -to-support -the-onevoice-movement -.html (accessed November 
24,2009). 
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